د عدلي الهواري

Had everything worked according to plan, US foreign policy toward the Middle East would have produced “The Geneva Accords”[1] rather than the Camp David Accords; and instead of a bilateral peace treaty, it would have produced multilateral, comprehensive peace, encompassing Israel and at least its immediate neighbors, i.e., Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and of course Egypt. Furthermore, the Palestinian problem, the source of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would have been resolved with some form of “homeland”[2] for the Palestinians, as once advocated by the architect of the Camp David Accords, President Jimmy Carter.

Why then the original ‘plan’ of American foreign policymakers did not materialize? And what could that tell us about the American approach to achieving the objectives of the USA’s policy toward the Middle East?

Before attempting to answer these questions, one should state briefly what the Camp David Accords were.

Between 5-17 September 1978, President Carter, Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, were engaged in intensive negotiations at Camp David, the presidential resort in Maryland. The three leaders and their teams were isolated from the outside world for thirteen days, after which it was announced to the world that an agreement was reached, consisting of two parts:

1. A Framework for Peace in the Middle East.

2. A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The Accords paved the way for signing a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, ending a state of war that lasted nearly thirty years and saw four major wars.

Why was it very important for the USA to try very hard to reach a ‘comprehensive’[3] settlement for the Arab-Israeli dispute instead of waiting until the concerned parties were ready for it, or instead of continuing the bilateral, step-by- step approach of Henry Kissinger?

To be able to answer these questions, one should shed some light on America’s interests in the Middle East. Seth P. Tillman, a former member of the professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, identified four basic interests:

1. reliable access, on reasonable terms, at tolerable prices, to the oil of the region, especially the Arabian Peninsula;

2. the survival of the State of Israel;

3. the avoidance of confrontation and advancement of cooperation with the Soviet Union; and

4. the fulfillment so far as possible of certain principles, including the peaceful settlements of international disputes, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and the right of people to self-determination.”[4]

Oil, therefore, was and still is on top of the list. This was of added importance because in the mid-1970s, the USA and Western Europe felt the impact of the Arab oil embargo which was imposed after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

The avoidance of an energy crisis was so much on Carter’s mind. He advocated searching for alternative sources of energy, and in August 1977 established the Department of Energy, headed by James Schlesinger. According to William B. Quandt, “a comprehensive energy policy,” as far as Carter was concerned, “was corollary of a comprehensive Middle East policy.”[5]

Now that I offered an explanation for why the USA actively engaged itself in searching for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, I would like to attempt to explain why Carter himself was deeply involved in the process. American interests, after all, existed before Carter took office, but unlike him, his predecessors were not as involved personally.

Carter was described by his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as an “activist president.” Brzezinski observed in his memoirs that “Carter wanted to be his own Secretary of State, and would be in control over foreign policy in the White House.”[6]

Achieving peace in the Middle East was thought to be in need of the Soviet Union’s help. In this respect, there were two schools of thought. The champion of the first was Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who in November 1976 suggested to President Carter that “as a practical matter, the Soviet Union, with political interests in the region and as patron of several Arab states, should be accorded a role in the negotiations that would help dissuade it from undermining our efforts.”[7]

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the champion of the other school of thought, saw otherwise. He argued that “the Soviets should not be involved substantially in the negotiations, but the prospect of a Geneva conference—which the Soviets would co-chair—should be used as a form of pressure on the Israelis and inducement for the Arabs, but not an end in itself.”[8]

The nearest thing to giving the Soviet Union a say in the peace process was the joint Soviet-American statement of October 1977. In it, Vance and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, outlined the views of both countries on the goals to be achieved if and when a Geneva conference reconvened again under joint chairmanship.[9] Contrary to Vance’s expectations, the joint statement was counterproductive. It was the object of “fierce denunciation by Israel, some members of the Congress, and by members of American Jewish community.”[10]

For the purpose of this essay, I would like to concentrate on the opposition to the statement in the United States. Some of the strongest criticism came from Senator Howard Baker, the Republican minority leader, who expressed “strong objection to the dramatic and sudden reintroduction of the Soviet Union in the negotiation process.[11] Senator Henry Jackson, the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also attacked the Soviet-American statement which, Jackson thought, allow “the Soviet fox back in the chicken coop.[12]

Moreover, William Safire, a columnist in The New York Times, described the statement as a “Carter plan to impose a settlement that turns the West Bank into a Soviet staging area against Israel.[13] The President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), George Meany, warned that “any attempt to undercut Israel would backfire politically on the president.[14] One should point out here that what was being attacked was the administration’s approach not the objective.

What could have been done after the failure of the initial moves and approach in producing the desired results, namely reconvening the Geneva peace conference as a means of bringing about a comprehensive, multilateral peace? It would appear that adjusting the approach and objectives was in order.

Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, few weeks after the joint Soviet-American statement, provided the golden opportunity for making this adjustment. In their assessment of the situation in view of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, it became obvious to both President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, that “the probable outcome of Sadat’s initiative would be an initial peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.”[15]

On the basis of that conclusion, the Carter administration began from early 1978 onward to work on “two parallel paths toward peace: agreement between Egypt and Israel on bilateral issues between them and an interim solution to the problem of a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza.”[16]

Realizing this objective was not an easy task. It required Carter to intervene personally and involve himself in the process more than he did before. Therefore, he came up with the idea of inviting Sadat and Begin to Camp David, where the three spent thirteen days before finally reaching an agreement on 12 September 1978. Carter continued to be personally involved in the process of implementing the Accords until the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed in March 1979.

Few months later, however, he appointed Robert Strauss, a former Chairman of the Democratic Party, as a special negotiator to implement the Palestinian part of the Accords. Domestic political motives were thought to be behind this appointment.[17]

One of the motives was the approaching Democratic Party primaries (1980), as William B. Quandt pointed out. However, this was not the only reason. Quandt also cited the Iranian revolution which led to “an increase in the price of oil, and lines were forming at gas stations throughout the country.”[18]

The Camp David Accords, no doubt, were Carter’s greatest achievement. However, it did not help him get re-elected for a second term. The seizure of the American embassy in the Iranian capital, Tehran,(November 1979) and holding its staff hostage for more than a year damaged his re-election prospects. His handling of the crisis by shying away from maintaining a business-as-usual posture made him look, in the eyes of the electorate, as being paralyzed by crisis.

I would like to end this essay by going back to the two questions asked in the introduction. The answer to both questions would be in underscoring the impact of domestic, political pressures; and considerations of the U.S. foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East.

= = =

Notes

[1] In December 1973, the USA and Soviet Union co-chaired the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. It was attended by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the UN Secretary-General. Only one session was held. Reconvening it continued to be an objective.

[2] President Jimmy Carter spoke of a homeland for the Palestinians on 16 March 1976 in a speech delivered in Massachusetts.

[3] A comprehensive settlement meant one involving all Israel’s neighbors, resolving all contentious issues (borders, security, etc.), and leading to normalization of all relations (political, economic, etc.).

[4] Seth P. Tillman, American Interests in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 50-51.

[5] William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 35.

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 4-5.

[7] Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 164.

[8] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 87.

[9] The Statement called for a comprehensive settlement ‘incorporating all parties concerned and all questions,’ and among other things ’the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.’ Both countries expressed willingness to participate in international guarantees of observance of the settlement.

[10] Tillman, American Interests, 234.

[11] Quoted by Tillman, American Interests, p. 234.

[12] Quoted by C. Paul Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process: A Study of Carter Administration Policies 1977-1980 (Grantham, NH: Tompson and Rutter, 1981), 15.

[13] Tillman, American Interests, 234.

[14] Tillman, American Interests, 234.

[15] Vance, Hard Choices, 195.

[16]. Vance, Hard Choices, 195.

[17] George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 80.

[18] Quandt, Camp David, 24.